Abstract. This paper examines the security of AES-192 and AES-256 against a related-key rectangle attack. We find the following new attacks: 8-round reduced AES-192 with 2 related keys, 10-round reduced AES-192 with 64 or 256 related keys and 9-round reduced AES-256 with 4 related keys. Our attacks reduce the complexity of earlier attacks presented at FSE 2005 and Eurocrypt 2005: for reduced AES-192 with 8 rounds, we decrease the required number of related keys from 4 to 2 at the cost of a higher data and time complexity; we present the first shortcut attack on AES-192 reduced to 10 rounds; for reduced AES-256 with 9 rounds, we decrease the required number of related keys from 256 to 4 and both the data and time complexity at the cost of a smaller number of attacked rounds. Furthermore, we point out some flaw in the 9-round AES-192 attack presented at Eurocrypt 2005, show how to fix it and enhance the attack in terms of the number of related keys.
Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), the successor to the Data Encryption Standard (DES), is a block cipher adopted as mandatory encryption standard by the US government. Since NIST announced that the block cipher Rijndael, designed by Daemen and Rijmen [12] , was selected for the AES in 2000, it has gradually become one of the most widely used encryption algorithms in the The outline of this paper is as follows: in Sect. 2, we give a brief description of AES and in Sect. 3, we describe a general method of the related-key rectangle attack. Sections 4 and 5 present our related-key rectangle attacks on reduced AES-192 and AES-256. Section 6 gives some comments on the previous 9-round AES-192 attack. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sect. 7.
Description of AES
AES encrypts data blocks of 128 bits with 128, 192 or 256-bit keys. According to the length of the keys, AES uses a different number of rounds, i.e., it has 10, 12 and 14 rounds when used with 128, 192 and 256-bit keys, respectively. The round function of AES consists of the following four basic transformations:
-SubBytes (SB) is a nonlinear byte-wise substitution that applies the same 8 × 8 S-box to every byte.
-ShiftRows (SR) is a cyclic shift of the i-th row by i bytes to the left.
-MixColumns (MC) is a matrix multiplication applied to each column.
-AddRoundKey (ARK) is an exclusive-or with the round key.
Each round function of AES applies the SB, SR, MC and ARK steps in order, but MC is omitted in the last round. Before the first round, an extra ARK step is applied. We call the key used in this step a whitening key. For more details of the above four transformations, we refer to [12] .
AES uses different key scheduling algorithms according to the length of the supplied keys. -For i = s till i = t do the following (for AES-128, s = 4 and t = 43),
where RotByte represents one byte rotation and Rcon denotes fixed constants depending on its input. In AES-128, the whitening key is (W 
Similarly, the key schedules of AES-192 and AES-256 accept 192-and 256-bit keys, and generate as many subkeys as required. The key schedule of AES-192 is exactly the same as that of AES-128 except for the use of s = 6 and t = 51. The subkeys of AES-256 are derived from the following procedure:
In this paper a 128-bit block of AES is represented by a 4×4 byte matrix as in Fig. 1 or by ((X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , X 3 ), (X 4 , X 5 , X 6 , X 7 ), (X 8 , X 9 , X 10 , X 11 ), (X 12 , X 13 , X 14 , X 15 )) . 
The Related-Key Rectangle Attack
The related-key rectangle attack is based on two consecutive related-key differentials with relatively high probabilities which are independent of each other: the underlying cipher E : {0,
n is treated as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E = E 1 • E 0 , where {0, 1} k and {0, 1} n are the key space and the plaintext/ciphertext space, respectively. We assume that for E 0 there exists a related-key differential α → β with probability p and for E 1 there exists a related-key differential γ → δ with probability q. More precisely,
for known key differences ∆K and ∆K . Then, these consecutive related-key differentials can be used efficiently to the following related-key rectangle distinguisher:
-Choose two random n-bit plaintexts P and P and compute two other plaintexts P * = P ⊕ α and P * = P ⊕ α. -With a chosen plaintext attack scenario, obtain the corresponding cipher-
The probability that the ciphertext quartet (C, C * , C C * ) satisfies the last δ test is computed as follows: let X, X * , X and X * denote the encrypted values of P, P * , P and P * under E 0 with K, K * , K and K * , respectively. Then, the probability that X ⊕ X * = X ⊕ X * = β is about p 2 by the related-key differential for E 0 . In the above process, we randomly choose two plaintexts P and P , so we expect X ⊕ X = γ with probability 2 −n . Once the two above events occur,
with probability 1. Since the probability of the related-key differential γ → δ for E 1 is q, X ⊕ X = X * ⊕ X * = γ goes to C ⊕ C = C * ⊕ C * = δ with a probability of about q 2 . Therefore, the total probability that the last δ test in the above process is satisfied is about
On the other hand, for a random cipher, the δ test holds with probability 2 −2n and thus if the above probability is larger than 2 −2n for any 4-tuple (α, δ, ∆K, ∆K ), i.e., if p · q > 2 −n/2 , the related-key rectangle distinguisher can be used to distinguish E from a random cipher. Similarly, two consecutive related-key truncated differentials can be used to form a related-key rectangle distinguisher.
According to the condition of the key differences ∆K and ∆K , the above related-key rectangle distinguisher is used in different ways. If ∆K = 0 and ∆K = 0, then the distinguisher works with two related keys; a related-key differential for E 0 and a regular (non-related-key) differential for E 1 . If ∆K = 0 and ∆K = 0, then the distinguisher also works with two related keys; however, a regular differential for E 0 and a related-key differential for E 1 are used. If ∆K = 0, ∆K = 0 and ∆K = ∆K , then the distinguisher works with four related keys, in which related-key differentials for both E 0 and E 1 are used. Further, more than four related keys can be used in the related-key rectangle distinguisher as in [6, 7] ; the basic idea is the same as that of the distinguisher with two or four related keys.
4 Related-Key Rectangle Attack on 10-Round This section shows how to exploit the related-key rectangle attack to devise key recovery attacks on 10-round AES-192 with 64 or 256 related keys. We first focus on 10-round AES-192 with 256 related keys.
Denote the 10 rounds of AES-192 by
is round 0 including the whitening key addition step and excluding the key addition step of round 0, E 0 is rounds 1-4 including the key addition step of round 0, E 1 is rounds 5-8 and E f is round 9. In our 10-round AES-192 attack, we use a related-key truncated differential for E 0 depicted in Fig. 2 and another related-key truncated differential for E 1 depicted in Fig. 3 . After we convert these related-key truncated differentials for E 0 and E 1 into a related-key rectangle distinguisher for E 1 • E 0 , we apply it to recover some portions of the keys in E b and E f . Before describing our attack, we define some notation which is used in our attacks on AES.
-b, c: output differences of S-box for the fixed nonzero input difference a. - * : a variable and unknown byte.
8-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher
Our related-key truncated differentials depicted in Figs. 2 and 3 exploit the slow difference propagation of the key schedule of AES-192, which makes it possible that 3-round key differences ∆K 0 ||∆K 1 ||∆K 2 and
is the byte Hamming weight of X. Using these key differences with small byte Hamming weights we make ∆I 1 = ∆I 6 = 0 in our related-key truncated differentials which induce HW b (∆I 3 ) = HW b (∆I 8 ) = 1 (see Figs. 2 and 3 for ∆K i , ∆K i , ∆I i and ∆I i ) and we add one or two more rounds to get longer related-key differentials. Note that our related-key truncated differential for E 0 is the same as the one for rounds 0-3 (including the whitening key addition step) used in [16] .
In order to convert the two 4-round related-key truncated differentials into an 8-round related-key rectangle distinguisher, we first make the following Assumptions 1, 2 and 3.
is related as follows;
Assumption 2. A plaintext quartet (P, P * , P , P * ) is related as follows; Note that ∆K is the same as the first six columns of ∆K w ||∆K 0 in Fig. 2 . As stated in our notation,
(this probability has been used for the 8-round AES-192 attack presented in [16] ). It follows from counting over all the differentials that can be generated by the active S-box with input difference a and the other four active S-boxes in round 4. Since ShiftRows and MixColumns are linear layers, they can be ignored in round 4 when computing the probability (see Fig. 2 ). Moreover, the probability that Fig. 3 for ∆I 5 ). Hence the probability that 5 , where e is the encryption for round 5,
with a probability of 2 −231 (see Fig. 3 for ∆I 9 ). However, the same statement can be applied to a random cipher with probability (2
, since the number of elements in ∆I 9 is 2 7 − 1. The first column of ∆I 9 is
Key Recovery Attack on 10-Round AES-192 with 256 Related Keys
In order to produce the round-key differences depicted in Fig. 3 , the 8-bit difference a should satisfy the 8-bit difference b after S-box during the key generation for the third column of ∆K 3 . Given the 8-bit difference a there are 127 possible candidates for the b difference, hence the attack starts by gathering all possible key quartets (K, K * , K , K * ) of which one satisfies the desired key condition. Note that the keys
where ∆K is fixed as ∆K w and the first two columns of ∆K 0 in Fig. 2 and ∆ K is one of the 127 possible differences; bytes 8 and 12 are both a, bytes 3 and 11 are both b and other bytes are all zeros, where b is one of the 127 possible candidates for the b difference. So the total number of required related keys is 256. We apply the related-key rectangle attack to 10-round AES-192 for each key quartet. During this procedure, we stop our attack when we have found a key quartet (K, K * , K , K * ) that satisfies the desired key condition b = b, i.e.,
. The aim of our attack is to recover bytes 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 of the whitening key quartet (K w , K * w , K w , K * w ) and bytes 0, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13 of the subkey quartet (K 9 , K * 9 , K 9 , K * 9 ), for which the byte positions are marked as * on ∆P and ∆I 10 depicted in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 .
143 key guesses in total (in our attack it can be reduced by a factor of two on average).
The attack algorithm goes as follows: 
where ∆k w and ∆ k w are the fixed 64-bit key differences in the position of bytes 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13 of ∆K w (depicted in Fig. 2) and ∆ K w , respectively. For the subkey quartet (k w , k * w , k w , k * w ), do the following: 
Partially encrypt each plaintext
) ∈ ∆I 10 (1)||∆I 10 (2) for all i, j, l 0 and l 1 , where
is any 8-bit value, and b i is one of the output differences caused by the input difference a to the S-box. Note that ∆I 10 (1) and ∆I 10 (2) are both candidates for ∆I 10 , i.e., b 2 is a candidate for c (see Fig. 3 6. Guess an 8-bit subkey k 9,w in the position of byte 8 in round 9 and set k 9,w = k 9,w . For the 8-bit subkey pair (k 9,w ,k 9,w ), do the following:
6.1 For all the remaining ciphertext quartets (C i,l 0 , C j,l1 , C * i,l0 , C * j,l1 ), partially decrypt C i,l0 and C j,l1 under k 9,w and k 9,w through E f , respectively. If the partially decrypted pairs do not have the difference a, then discard the corresponding ciphertext quartets. Since this imposes approximately a 7-bit filtering, the number of remaining quartets after this step is about 2 58 . 6.2 Guess an 8-bit value d to form an 8-bit subkey pair (k * 9,w = k 9,w ⊕ d, k * 9,w = k 9,w ⊕d) in the position of byte 8 in round 9. For the 8-bit subkey pair (k * 9,w ,k * 9,w ), do the following: 6.2.1 For all the remaining ciphertext quartets (
under k * 9,w and k * 9,w through E f , respectively. If the partially decrypted pairs do not have the difference a, discard the corresponding ciphertext quartets and then go to Step 7. It also induces approximately a 7-bit filtering, hence the number of remaining quartets after this step is about 2 51 . (Similarly, Step 6 can be performed efficiently.)
7. Guess a 32-bit subkey k 9,y in the position of bytes 0, 7, 10, 13 in round 9 and compute k 9,y = k 9,y ⊕ (a, 0, 0, 0). For the 32-bit subkey pair (k 9,y , k 9,y ), do the following:
For all the remaining ciphertext quartets (C
), partially decrypt C i,l0 and C j,l 1 under k 9,y and k 9,y through E f , respectively. If the differences of the partially decrypted pairs are not in B (see Eq. (1) 
under k * 9,y and k * 9,y through E f , respectively. If the differences of the partially decrypted pairs are not in B, discard the corresponding ciphertext quartets and then go to Step 8. This also induces approximately about a 25-bit filtering, hence the number of remaining quartets after this step is about 2 for each wrong key guess. (For each guess of 143-bit (e, f, k 9,y , d, k 9,w , k 9,v , k w , ∆ K ), this step takes 2 26+1 · (4/16) · (1/10) = 2 21.7 encryptions.)
For the remaining ciphertext quartets (C
), classify the quartets according to the differences of C i,l 0 and C j,l1 by byte 11. Discard all the ciphertext quartets except for the group with the largest number of quartets and then go to Step 9. Since this results in approximately a 7-bit filtering for each pair of quartets, the remaining quartets after this step is expected to be about 2 −6 for each wrong key guess. (It takes a relatively small time complexity.) 9. If there are more than 16 quartets in the table, then output the guessed subkey quartet as the right one. Otherwise, run the above steps with another guess for the subkey quartet, i.e., (e, f,
About 2 125 chosen plaintexts in Steps 1, 2 and 3 are encrypted on average, hence the data complexity of this attack is about 2 125 related-key chosen plaintexts and the time complexity of Steps 1, 2 and 3 is about 2 125 encryptions.
Step 4 runs about 2 70 times, so the time complexity of Step 4.2 is about 2 60.7+70 = 2
130.7
encryptions (it can be improved by a factor of about 2 4 by using a pre-computed table 1 ) and the time complexity of Step 4.3 is about 2 112+70 = 2 182 encryptions. As stated above, Steps 5, 6 and 8 take relatively small time complexities compared to other steps.
The time complexity for Step 7 depends on how many times this step runs, which can be measured by the number of guessed subkeys (including d, e and f ). Since Steps 7.1 and 7.2 run in this attack 2 126 and 2 142 times on average, these steps take 2 172.7 and 2 163.7 encryptions, respectively. However, the time complexities of these steps can be improved by using a divide and conquer technique. In Step 7.1, two of the four bytes of the remaining ciphertext quartets are first decrypted (these partial decryptions can be performed after the remaining ciphertext quartets are sorted by these two bytes) and discard the ciphertext quartets of which the decrypted two bytes do not have a difference in B with respect to the two-byte position, and then do this test with other two bytes of the remaining ciphertext quartets byte by byte. With this divide and conquer technique, we can also run Step 7.2. This method allows Steps 7.1 and 7.2 to decrease their time complexities down to about 2 135.7 and 2 146.7 encryptions, respectively.
We can calculate the success rate of the attack by using the Poisson distribution. Since the expected number of remaining quartets for each wrong subkey quartet is 2 −6 , the probability that the number of remaining quartets for each wrong subkey quartet is larger than 16 is 2 −150 by the Poisson distribution,
. It follows that the probability that the attack outputs a wrong subkey quartet is quite low, since the total number of guessed wrong subkey quartets is about 2 142 . On the other hand, the expected number of remaining quartets for the right subkey quartet is about 2 5 = 2 236 · 2 −231 due to our 8-round related-key rectangle distinguisher. Thus, 
Reducing the Number of Related Keys from 256 to 64
If we take more delicate related keys in our attack, we can reduce the number of related keys from 256 to 64 (note that the basic idea of this method has been introduced in [8] ). The following 64 related keys can be used in our attack: Using these delicately chosen key relationships, we can make 256 key quartets
of which one is expected to satisfy the desired key condition, 125 encryptions. However, we have observed that there is some flaw in the key guessing step in their attack. In order to complete their attack, we need to guess in addition 56 bits of the subkey in the last round, hence the attack requires a larger time complexity of 2 181 = 2 125 · 2 56 rather than 2 125 encryptions. Moreover, their attack can be mounted based on 64 related keys as in our 10-round AES-192 attack. Similarly, it allows the 9-round AES-192 attack to work with a smaller data complexity, but a larger time complexity than the original ones; in our observation their attack works with 64 related keys, a data complexity of 2 85 related-key chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 2 182 . This method (for reducing the number of related keys) can also be used in the 10-round AES-256 attack presented at Eurocrypt 2005. See Table 1 for the attack complexity.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented related-key rectangle attacks on 8-round AES-192 with 2 related keys, 10-round AES-192 with 64 or 256 related keys and 9-round AES-256 with 4 related keys, which are faster than exhaustive key search. All our attacks have been designed based on the key scheduling algorithms of AES-192 and AES-256 which have relatively slow difference propagations.
Our 10-round AES-192 attack leads to the best known attack on AES-192 and our 8-round AES-192, 9-round AES-256 attacks are both better than previously best known attacks on AES-192 with 2 related keys and AES-256 with 4 related keys in terms of the number of attacked rounds and the data or time complexity. It should be clear, however, that none of these attacks presents a realistic threat to the security of the AES.
